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$EVWUDFW
This paper develops a simple demand model with network externalities which allow us 
to identify the shape of the network externalities function in the mobile telephone 
market and to estimate the critical mass. If the mobile telephone network exhibits 
positive network externalities, we expect that the demand curve is not downward 
sloping everywhere but it has an increasing part, the FULWLFDOPDVVof the installed base 
of subscribers. Once the critical mass is reached, the growth of the network is self-
sustaining. We use a panel data of the 30 OEDC Countries from 1989 to 2006 for 
estimating the relationship between price of 3-minute cellular call and the installed base 
of subscribers; we find strong network externalities effects in mobile telephone market 
which drive the demand curve for this network good to be an inverted U function. 
Moreover, given that the concavity of the demand curve depends on the extent of 
network externalities, the idea is to identify some variables which could affect the 
intensity of network effects in the mobile telephone market, because the more concave 
the demand curve is, sooner the critical mass is reached for any price. This may have 
important implications for producers in terms of initial investment and marketing 
strategies which they have to do to attain the critical mass. 
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 ,QWURGXFWLRQ
 
The growth of the telecommunication network1 is one of the economic and social most 
relevant aspects of the recent years. Telecommunications growth means an ever larger 
number of users operators, connections and services. It means more and more 
bandwidth and longer periods of network utilisation. 
Presently, the telecommunications sector is going through a revolutionary change. The 
rapid technological change in key inputs of telecommunications services and in 
complementary goods has reduced dramatically the costs of traditional services and 
have made many new services available at reasonable prices. Moreover, the sweeping 
digitization of the telecommunications and the related sectors contributed to the change. 
The underlying telecommunications technology has become digital and the consumer 
and business telecommunications interfaces have become more versatile and closer to 
multifunction computers than to traditional telephones. 
Digitization and integration of telecommunications services with computers create lot of 
business opportunities and impose significant pressure on traditional pricing structures, 
especially in voice telephony. 
The tremendous growth in demand of the mobile telecommunication network in 1994-
95 was not driven as much by price reduction as it was by the “feedback” effect 
introduced by both past increases and anticipated future increase in the size of the 
installed base; in other words, “critical mass” of the installed base of consumers was 
reached. The concept of critical mass is linked to that of QHWZRUNH[WHUQDOLWLHV. Indeed, 
the telecommunication network is a typical one characterized by GLUHFW QHWZRUN
H[WHUQDOLWLHV (see section 2) which play a fundamental role for the growth of this market. 
Economic literature showed that consumption network externalities could have an 
important implication for size and structure of the telecommunication market. A major 
problem facing a producer interested in LQWURGXFLQJ a network good is the ability to 
attain the FULWLFDOPDVV: a group of subscribers to startup. When we look at the new TLC 
services, it is difficult to know how to identify which of them will take off and become a 
new kind of network, and, indeed, what distinguishes the successful new network from 
those that fail to become realized.  
                                                     
1
 A network is a market in which the benefit each consumer obtains from a good is an increasing function 
of the number of consumers who own the same or similar goods. 
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The existence of network externalities shapes the perception of good’s value during a 
network startup: prospective subscribers perceive more value as the subscribers base 
grows. Then, value increases with size, at least to the limit of the community with which 
any subscriber wants to communicate. This is why, in the start-up, as the quantity of 
subscribers rises, the price rises too, showing a positive slope of the demand for the 
network good. 
Startup network differs in one key aspect from the mature network: the need of a 
FULWLFDOPDVV. Once the critical mass is reached the system experiments its development 
and growth which characterizes its maturity. As a consequence, new subscribers to a 
mature network can join one after another rather than as a group. This is why we should 
not expect to find evidence of network externalities in mature network. 
Rogers (2003) defines the critical mass as the minimal number of subscribers (adopters) 
of an interactive innovation for the further rate of adoption to be self-sustaining; that is, 
network effects can generate multiple stable equilibria separated by an instable one, the 
critical mass.  
Economides & Himmelberg (1995) propose another concept of FULWLFDO PDVV the 
minimal non-zero sustainable equilibrium size (market coverage) of a network good or 
service (for any price); for many network goods, the critical mass is of significant size, 
and therefore for these goods smaller market coverage will never be observed. Common 
to both the definition is that consumers must be convinced that the market will be 
sufficiently large to justify their purchase (since utility of the network good’s consumers 
depends on the number of other consumers). Then costumers must be convinced about 
the intentions of the others. Thus, common knowledge of beliefs is required to 
guarantee that critical mass will, indeed, be reached. And, once the critical mass is 
reached the network experiments an exponential growth.  
During the start-up phase of new technologies, when network externalities do not play 
an active role in developing demand, the effort to overcome this structural inertia of the 
diffusion process and reach a critical mass will require supply incentives. The amount of 
the incentives, if these are financial incentives, is highly dependent on the critical mass 
level and this level is in its turn dependent on the interest an individual (or group of 
individuals) has in infrastructure itself. In other words, the amount of the financial 
incentives required to stimulate networks depends on the LQWHQVLW\ZLWKZKLFKQHWZRUN
H[WHUQDOLWLHVSOD\WKHLUUROHLQWKHGLIIXVLRQSURFHVV.   
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From this last point come the idea which constitute the aim of the paper. It provides an 
empirical study on the extent of network effects in mobile telecommunications.  
We developed a simple demand model with network externalities which allow us to 
identify the shape of the network externalities function in the mobile telephone market 
and to estimate the critical mass. The theoretical literature has showed that the demand 
curve in presence in network effects has an increasing part;  the upward-sloping part of 
the inverted U consists of unstable equilibria and constitutes the critical mass of the 
good or services (for any given price). If the critical mass is exceeded, demand expands 
to the downward sloping part of the inverted U which consists of stable equilibria.  
Existing empirical literature shows the difficulty in estimating the critical mass point; 
the present paper try to develop a methodology to do that and to measure the network 
externalities effects which could be useful for forecasting the diffusion of future 
telecommunication technologies, such as UMTS (3G) and 4G. 
In our knowledge this is one of the very few panel empirical analysis on the network 
externalities effects; it uses the variables in the World Telecommunication/ICT 
indicators database of 30 OEDC Countries from 1989 to 2006.  
Under the hypothesis that the best proxy for the future installed base of the mobile 
telephone network is the past installed base, we estimate a network externality function 
and we find strong network effects in mobile telecommunications. Given that, we 
estimate the demand for mobile telephone services and we show that the critical mass 
exists and depends on the extent of the network externalities: the more concave the 
inverted U is, sooner the critical mass is reached for any price. Then the idea is to 
identify some variables which can affect the critical mass. Reaching the critical mass 
point is fundamental in the start-up phase of the network good: the question is simply of 
getting beyond the critical mass point to have a diffusion path which is self-sustaining. 
We found that variables such as the population density, the internet base of subscribers, 
the number of digital mainlines and the rate of schooling, affected the intensity of 
network externalities in mobile telephone market and then the critical mass. Knowing 
that, producers of network goods in telecommunication market can design their 
marketing strategies to reach the critical mass according to the presence of those 
variables. 
This paper wants to enrich the poor empirical literature on network externalities effect, 
analyzing the market where probably these network externalities are more present. 
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The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 summarize the literature on network 
externalities; Section 3 provide a description the TLC market; in Section 4 we make a 
descriptive analysis and in section 5 we discuss the empirical analysis and the results; 
Section 6 provides the concluding remarks and the lines for further investigations.   
 
 7KH/LWHUDWXUH
 
The literature on network effects usually distinguishes among two types of network 
externalities: GLUHFW QHWZRUN H[WHUQDOLWLHV and LQGLUHFW QHWZRUN H[WHUQDOLWLHV. Direct 
network externalities refer to the case where users directly benefit from the fact that 
there are large numbers of other users of the same network; that is, direct network 
externalities are generated through a direct effect of the number of agents, consuming 
the same good, on the utility function of agents themselves (through a creation of new 
goods that directly and positively affects the utility function of every participant to the 
network). The TLC network (fixed and mobile) is a typical one characterized by direct 
network externalities which, indeed, arises when the user can call a larger set of other 
users.  
Indirect network externalities arise when the value of a good increases as the number, or 
variety, of complementary goods increases: the addiction of new varieties of one type of 
components affects positively but indirectly the utility of all participants through the 
reduction of prices. More generally, most markets with indirect network externalities 
are characterized by the presence of two distinct sides which benefit from the 
interaction among them. Typical examples are the PC market and the credit cards 
network. 
Positive network externalities give rise to positive feedback; positive feedback makes 
the strong get stronger and the weak get weaker, leading to extreme outcomes. In a 
network the firm’s dominance is based on GHPDQGVLGHHFRQRPLHVRIVFDOHCustomers 
value the firm’s good EHFDXVH it is widely used, the de facto industry standard; rival 
goods just don't have the critical mass to pose much of a threat. Unlike the supply-side 
economies of scale, demand-side economies of scale don't dissipate when the market 
gets large enough: if everybody else uses the firm’s good, that's even more reason for 
you to use it too. So marketing strategy designed to influence consumer expectations is 
critical in network markets. 
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With network externalities the fundamental relationship between price and quantity may 
fail2. For these goods, the willingness to pay for the last unit increases as the number 
expected to be sold increases. If expected sales equal actual sales, the willingness to pay 
for the last unit PD\ increase with the number of units sold. Thus, for goods with 
network externalities, the (fulfilled expectations) demand-price schedule may not slope 
downward everywhere; in such markets, as costs decrease we may observe 
discontinuous expansions in sales rather than the smooth expansion along a downward 
sloping demand curve.  
If the number of people who connect to the network is low, then the willingness to pay 
of the marginal individual is low, because there aren’t many other people out there that 
he/she can communicate with; if there are a large number of people connected, then the 
willingness to pay of the marginal individual is low, because everyone else who valued 
it more highly has already connected. This is why we can imagine a demand curve for 
network goods like that in figure 1. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    )LJXUH 
 
The network starts at essentially zero, with a few small perturbations over time. As cost 
decreases over time (due to the technological progress), at some point it reaches a 
critical mass (the unstable equilibrium) that kicks us up past the low-level equilibrium 
and the system then zooms up to the high-level equilibrium (as shown by the arrows in 
figure 1). Then the two stable equilibria are zero and the highest level of the network 
size. The middle equilibrium is unstable because if one person decides to drops out of 
the network, then at least one of the remaining subscribers will find it unprofitable to 
belong and will leave (the value of the good is lower than the cost); but when this 
                                                     
2
 For normal goods which do not exhibit network externalities, demand slopes downward; as price 
decreases, more of the good is demanded.  
High cost 
Size of network 
Demand 
curve 
Low cost 
Willingness  
to pay 
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happens, at least another person will leave and so on until the network has no remaining 
members. If, on the other hand, one person decides to join, another member will find 
profitable to join to, and so on until the highest equilibrium level. Therefore, to get the 
high level equilibrium from the zero equilibrium, it would be not necessary for all 
consumers to agree in advance to join; all that would be needed is to achieve the critical 
mass, that is, the number needed to get just beyond the unstable equilibrium. 
The stable equilibrium has a large number of people; here the price is small because the 
marginal person who purchases the good doesn’t value it very highly, even though the 
market is very large. As we can notice, the concept of critical mass is linked to this 
particular form of the demand curve. 
According to this explanation, the definition of the critical mass which we agree with is 
the “point after which further diffusion becomes self-sustaining”3.  
The concept of critical mass formalizes the "chicken and the egg" paradox that logically 
arises in such markets, namely: many consumers are not interested in purchasing the 
good because the installed base is too small, and the installed base is too small because 
an insufficiently small number of consumers have purchased the good.  
Before analyzing the theoretical and empirical literature on network externalities, we 
briefly describe the sources of network externalities in telecommunication network. 
First, with rising number of users having subscribed to a network, it becomes more 
attractive for other people also to buy a mobile phone and subscribe to the same 
network. This is the “direct effect” as in fixed-line telecommunications: consumers 
value the installed base of subscribers, because they can satisfy more communication 
needs4. Second, network expansion drives the usage volume of people already using 
mobile telecommunication: we would expect the usage volume of existing subscribers 
increases with the total number of mobile telephone subscribers. 
More recent economic literature (e.g. Granovetter and Soong, 1986; Becker, 1991; 
Lindbeck et al.,1999; Schoder, 2000) starts with the social interaction theory in order to 
show that another source of network externalities is a need of people to buy, consume, 
and behave like their follows; therefore we expect that consumption of mobile telephone 
service is influenced by such conformist behavior. 
                                                     
3
 Rogers (2003). 
4
 If the installed base of fixed-line subscribers is already huge, network effects could arise in mobile 
telecommunications when mobile customers can call the stationary numbers. However, short message 
service (SMS) – available only within mobile network – might help to generate the “traditional” network 
effects. 
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On-net call5 discounts offer another explanation for network effects in mobile 
telecommunications. Blonski (2002) call this effect as “endogenous network 
externality”: given that it is cheaper to call a mobile number from mobile telephone in 
the same network than from another network, larger mobile network implies - as before 
- lower monthly bill, hence higher attractiveness of mobile telephone service in general. 
 
After the seminal article of Rohlfs (1974), and the influential papers of Katz and 
Shapiro (1985) and Farrell and Saloner (1985), the theoretical studies on network 
effects became more and more rich; but, empirical works in this area are still poor. 
Greenstein (1993) conducts the first research in that stream. He shows that compatibility 
with the installed base matters in the choice of the mainframe computer system. Gandal 
(1994, 1995), in order to test the hypothesis that the software markets exhibit network 
externalities, estimates hedonic price equations for spreadsheets and data base 
management systems finding that the consumer’s willingness to pay for software 
supporting a common file compatibility standard is increasing. Similar results are in the 
Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) paper. Additionally, they find that a product’s 
installed base increases the price of spreadsheets. But those authors use a specification 
of hedonic price model which, in our mind, should be used in market with direct 
network externalities and not with indirect one, as in the spreadsheets network.  
In the empirical part of the Economides and Himmelberg (1995) paper they estimate the 
demand for facsimiles in the U.S. over 1978-1991. The assumption that facilitates the 
estimation is that expected network size is a linear function of the past network size. 
Fulfilled expectations would then lead to a constant growth rate of the U.S. fax network, 
which is counterfactual and breaks the consistency of that structural model. 
Others structural econometric works concerning network externalities include Gandal, 
Kende, and Rob (2000) for the CD industry and Rysmann (2002) for the Yellow Pages 
market. These authors concentrate on the indirect network effect and estimate two 
interrelated demand equations, for software and hardware, to model the 
complementarities between software and hardware. 
While it is widely acknowledged that network effects are a key feature of 
telecommunications industries, and indeed that telecommunications networks provide 
perhaps the leading example of network effects, relatively few studies have analyzed the 
empirical importance and extent of network effects in the telecommunications market. 
                                                     
5
 On-net calls are calls made to the same network; off-net calls are calls made to other network. 
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Empirical literature on mobile telecommunications concentrates on determinants of 
growth and competitiveness of the industry neglecting network effects in general. The 
study by Bousquet and Ivaldi (1997) is probably the first one which tests empirically for 
existence of network effects in the fixed-line telecommunications; the concept of 
network externality they use relies on received calls, which benefit subscribers without 
paying for them, rather than on installed base of subscribers. Next, Okada and Hatta 
(1999) specify demand for fixed-line and mobile telephone service adopting an Almost 
Ideal Demand System. They show that the number of mobile subscribers, as a quality 
measure for telephone service, has significant positive effect on share of 
telecommunications’ expenditures – both mobile and fixed-line – in households’ 
budgets. This result is an empirical evidence of network effects in demand for telephone 
service. Kim and Kwon (2003) show that consumers prefer mobile service providers 
with larger number of subscribers because of the intra-network call discounts and 
quality signaling effect. Directly related to our research is the study from Doganoglu 
and Grzybowski (2005) on network effects in the German mobile telecommunications 
market. They estimate a system of demand function for mobile subscribers in Germany 
in the period from January 1998 to June 2003 and find that network effects played a 
significant role in the diffusion of mobile services in Germany.  Grajek (2003) specifies 
a structural model of demand for mobile telephone service and estimate this model for 
the Polish mobile telephone industry using quarterly panel data for the period 1996-
2001; he provides empirical evidence on the extent of network effects and compatibility 
between networks in mobile telecommunications finding strong network effects, which 
give rise to upward-sloping demand, and, despite full interconnection of the mobile 
telephone networks, low compatibility.   
 
 'HVFULSWLRQRIWKHWHOHSKRQHPDUNHW

The fixed telephone market borns as a monopolistic one. The justification was the 
presence of economies of scale and of density which have leaded to a natural monopoly. 
This natural monopoly was a public one in Europe and a regulated one in USA. In 
Europe the market liberalization started in 1988; in USA it started in 1984 for the ORQJ
GLVWDQFH communications and in 1996 (with the Telecommunication Act) for the ORFDO 
communications.  
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The technology research and development contributed to reduce fixed costs and to shoot 
down the barriers to entry. This fixed telephone market has been always regulated, 
either with only one firm or with a plurality of firms,  to guarantee an efficient service to 
everyone, independently from their revenue.  
For the mobile telephone market the history has been different because there were not 
natural monopoly technology conditions but the number of firms in the market has been 
decided by the number of licenses offered by governments. 
In most countries, cellular phones were first available to end consumers in the 1980s 
with first-generation (1G) cellular networks, based on analogue signal transmission, 
which offered lower service quality. Analog cellular telephone systems were 
experiencing rapid growth in Europe, particularly in Scandinavia and the United 
Kingdom, but also in France and Germany. Each country developed its own system, 
which was incompatible with everyone else’s in equipment and operation. This was an 
undesirable situation, because not only the mobile equipment was limited to operation 
within national boundaries, which in a unified Europe were increasingly unimportant, 
but there was also a very limited market for each type of equipment, so economies of 
scale and the subsequent savings could not be realized. The Europeans realized this 
early on, and in 1982 the Conference of European Posts and Telegraphs CEPT, formed 
a study group called the Groupe Spécial Mobile GSM in order to study and develop a 
pan-European public land mobile system.  
Second generation (2G) network, based on digital technology, appeared in the middle of 
1990s offering greater network capacity and the SMS functionality, which enabled users 
to send short text messages to each other.  
In 1989, GSM responsibility was transferred to the European Telecommunication 
Standards Institute (ETSI), and phase I of the GSM specifications was published in 
1990, Commercial service was started in mid-1991 and by 1993 there were 36 GSM 
networks in 22 countries with 25 additional countries having already selected or 
considering GSM. Although standardized in Europe, GSM is not only a European 
standard. GSM networks are operational or planned in almost 60 countries in Europe, 
the Middle East, the Far East, Africa, South America and Australia. In the beginning of 
1994 there were 1,3 million subscribers worldwide. By the beginning of 1995 there 
were over 5 million subscribers. The acronym GSM now aptly stands for Global System 
for Mobile communications. 
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Once introduced, mobile telecommunication in the US and Europe always was in strong 
demand. In the 1990’s the rapid and sustained growth rate was accompanied by 
profound changes in the telecommunications markets. What once was the usual way to 
call someone changed from using the telephone booth or a fixed telephone line to using 
a personal phone kept in the pocket or in the handbag.  
Using a phone increasingly meant using a mobile phone instead of a fixed, a change that 
started in 1993. Global mobile communication - in all EU member states - is subject to 
regulation by an independent national regulatory authority (NRA). For the broader 
market only the European Commission targets the wholesale market, hence the retail 
market is essentially a national market (EC, 2006). 
The third generation (3G) networks allows the data transmission and is the technology 
in usage nowadays. For the 2G network, operators focused on capturing the mass 
market, that is, on reaching the critical mass of consumers. They adopted lots of 
strategies, as penetration pricing (taking losses for some years), or handset subsidies, 
giving handset away “for free” if the consumers signed up for a long-term contract. The 
best strategy implemented by cellular phone operators, which justified the rapid increase 
in the diffusion speed, was the prepaid contracts, which involved a per-minute cost 
instead of a monthly fee. After the explosion of the market, the number of tariffs has 
proliferated enormously. 
In the case of cellular telephony, direct network effects may operate across multiple 
operators and technologies (since users of a particular network can call users from other 
networks and even fixed line numbers) 
 
 'HVFULSWLYHDQDO\VLV
 
Figure 2 shows the mobile cellular telephone subscribers and the price of 3-minute 
cellular call6 from 1989 to 2006 (we call, in the picture, EDVH the mobile cellular 
telephone subscribers and SULFH the price of 3-minute cellular call). Our analysis begins 
in 1989 because before 1989 the data on mobile subscribers (and price) were not 
available given the absence of the cellular telephone market. The exponential growth of 
this market started from 1993-1994, when the GSM technology replaced the TACS 
                                                     
6
 We calculate the mean of the mobile cellular telephone subscribers and of the 3-minute cellular call 
across over the 30 OECD Countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxemburg, Mexico, 
Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, UK, US) for every year. 
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technology and when consumers started using mobile phone instead of fixed one. As the 
figure shows, after 1993-1994 the demand for mobiles began to accelerate drastically. In 
1997 it exploded to more than double the previous year, and in the following years it did 
the same; in 2004 the installed base has grown to more than 30 million subscribers. 
The plot for time series for price and subscribers reveals that the number of users 
connected to the network is initially small, and increases only gradually until the critical 
mass is reached, when the network growth takes off dramatically following a rapid 
decline in price. This picture seems to confirm the prediction of the theory.  
 
 
 
     )LJXUH
Interesting is Figure 3 which shows the mobile cellular subscribers over the population.  
 
 
     )LJXUH
 
The data speak for themselves: the fact that ‘everyone has a mobile phone’ is not very 
far away. Actually there are Countries that have a market penetration of more than 100 
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per cent because some individuals have multiple subscriptions, for example one at work 
and one for private use and temporary subscriptions in foreign countries. An important 
driver of demand is price decreases. Additional support to the strong market growth 
came from the Internet revolution and worldwide liberalisation, privatisation and 
deregulation of the telecommunication markets. The mobile phone has become a 
symbol of status and fashion, the use of a mobile phone is also a part of young people’s 
consumption style, incidentally to a large part paid by their parents (Wilska, 2003). 
The number of mobile network operators increased considerably as a result of two 
processes. The first is the liberalisation of fixed and mobile telephony which started in 
the 1980s; the second process is the incorporation and partial privatisation of the former 
incumbent public telecom operators in the 1980s and 1990s. As a consequence of 
competition, prices went down while traffic volumes increased. We can say that beside 
the introduction of prepaid cards and new services, such as the Short Message Service 
(SMS) and wireless application protocol (WAP), network effects are the most important 
force causing such tremendous growth rate.      
  
 (FRQRPHWULFPRGHODQDO\VLVDQGUHVXOWV
 
The explosive growth of the cellular network during the 90s was fueled by both realized 
and anticipated increases in the size of the installed base. This because of the network 
externalities.  
We developed a simple demand model with network externalities; using the mobile 
telephone market data, we test the shape of the network externalities function and we 
estimate the critical mass in this network. 
We define a network externalities function which captures the influence of network size 
expectations on the willingness to pay for the good provided through the network: KQ
 
, 
where Q
 
 is the expected size of the network (we specify and estimate the shape of this 
function later on). Network externalities are positive, so K¶! (larger expected sizes of 
networks give higher individual utility) and K¶¶ (the marginal network externality is 
decreasing in network size). Consumers are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1; *\7 
is the density function, where \ is the willingness to pay for one unit of the good in a 
network of expected size Q
 
. We use an addictive utility specification8: for a consumer 
                                                     
7
 G’(y) is positive. 
8
 All consumers receive the same benefit from the same network (Katz and Shapiro (1985), Cabral 
(1990), Economides (1995)). 
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indexed by \; the utility function for consuming the good in a network of expected size Q
 
  
is  
X\Q
 
 \KQ
 
          
Given expectations Q
 
 and price S, every consumer with 
X\Q
 
 \KQ
 
S         (1) 
will purchase the good; then we can impose the indifferent condition  
X\Q
 
 \KQ
 
 S         
to find \   S  KQ
 
: all consumers with \ ! \ will purchase the good. Given the 
uniform distribution of types, we find that  
Q \           
and then  
Q ±SKQ
 
          (2) 
We can invert the (2) and find the inverse demand function for the network good 
S ±QKQ
 
         (3) 
TheKQ
 
 gives the shape of the above inverse demand function. The hypothesis here is 
that the future (unobserved) installed base is approximated by the lagged network size: 
consumers care about the lagged network size in their decision about joining the 
network9. In our mind, the two most likely specifications of the KQ
 
 (given the 
constraints K¶! and K¶¶) are  
KQ
 
 NE  Q    E Q    

     and     KQ
 
 NE  Q    E ORJQ          
where N is the stand-alone value of the network good. 
To choose among them, we estimate both the functions 
      (4) 
and 
       (5) 
where Q     is the Mobile cellular telephone subscribers (Post-paid + Pre-paid), for Country 
i at time t; it refers to the use of portable telephones subscribing to a mobile telephone 
service and provides access to Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) using 
cellular technology. This can include analogue and digital cellular systems. This also 
includes subscribers to IMT-2000 (Third Generation, 3G). Given the compatibility of the 
different mobile operators in the same Country, we can consider the network size (the 
installed base) as composed by the sum of the number of subscribers of each network 
operator in every Country. These data come from the ITU database; the sample contains 
                                                     
9
 In the estimated equation the lagged network size corresponds to the lagged dependent variable. 
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the 30 OECD Countries from 1989 to 2006. We start from 1989 because before this year 
cellular almost didn’t exist. We have chosen the OECD Countries because of the same 
evolution of the telephone market. In our estimation we call Q     as EDVH    . The results are 
showed in table 1.  
It is well known by now that the standard approaches to panel data analysis are 
inappropriate in a dynamic setting. Both fixed and random effects estimators lead to 
biased and inconsistent estimation results in the presence of a lagged dependent variable 
(Baltagi, 1995). To remove this bias, it is necessary to provide a valid set of instruments 
for this lagged dependent variable. Arellano & Bond (1991)10 offer a solution to this 
problem by treating the model as a system of equations (viz. one for each time period) 
and developing a Generalized Method of Moments estimator that exploits the moment 
conditions for the equations in first differences. Specifically, the estimator is based on 
taking first differences of the model (to remove Countries-specific effects) and then 
instrumenting the lagged dependent variable in first differences with suitable lags of its 
own levels11.  
The coefficient showed in columns (a) and (b) of table 1 are estimated by the Arellano-
Bond GMM robust estimator. However, an important obstruction to using GMM is that 
the lagged values of the dependent variable may be only weak instruments in the 
differenced regression. This could lead to severe finite-sample bias, especially when the 
series is very persistent (see Blundell & Bond, 1998). Given this, we employ system 
GMM estimation (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998). This method 
combines the moment conditions for the equations in first differences exploited in the 
difference GMM estimator with additional moment conditions for the equations in 
levels. The introduction of these additional moments increases the efficiency of the 
                                                     
10
 Linear dynamic panel-data models include S lags of the dependent variable as covariates and contain 
unobserved panel-level effects, fixed or random. By construction, the unobserved panel-level effects are 
correlated with the lagged dependent variables, making standard estimators inconsistent. Arellano and 
Bond (1991) derive a consistent generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator for the parameters of 
the model 
 
ZKHUH j are p parameters to be estimated, xi,t is a vector of strictly exogenous variables, wi,t is a vector of 
SUHGHWHUPLQHGYDULDEOHV 1 DQG 2 are parameters to be estimated, vi are the random effects that are i.i.d. 
RYHUWKHSDQHOZLWKYDULDQFH
2
v DQG i,t DUHLLGRYHUWKHZKROHVDPSOHZLWKYDULDQFH
2
.  
11
 The estimator developed by Arellano & Bond (1991) is generally called difference GMM (or GMM-
DIF). It is ideal for short time series (such as ours). 
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estimation. Equations (c) and (d) in table 1 uses Blundell-Bond one-step GMM robust 
estimator. 
If the specification of the externalities function is the (4), to be h’>0 must be ni,t-1<a1/2a2 
which is not possible for the values of the installed base in the dataset12. Looking             
at the KQ
 
 specification in the (5) the estimated coefficients in columns (b) and (d) 
show that h’>0 and h’’<0 hold. In the estimation presented in columns (b) and (d) we 
control for the per capita GDP in US dollar (called *'3    ) and for population (called 
3RS    ), both for Country i at time t. The results are that the mobile telephone market 
exhibits strong positive network externalities: the estimated coefficients b1 and b2 are 
positive and highly significant. Moreover the marginal network externalities is 
decreasing: the wider the installed base is, the weaker the network externalities. The 
signs of the *'3     is positive (as expected) and significant; the same holds for the 
population. The last raw of the table 1 shows the p-value of the second order 
autocorrelation of residuals of the Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-
differenced errors13: in equation (b) at 5% there is no autocorrelation, in equation (d) 
there is.  
Once specified the shape of the network externalities function, we can write and 
estimate the inverse demand function for the mobile telephone service, as derived in 
equation (3).  
Stating from (3), we substitute  
KQ
 
 NE  Q    E  ORJQ    
and write 
S   Q  NE  Q    E ORJQ    ; 
in equilibrium Q   Q     and we find the willingness to pay of consumers for the mobile 
telephone services which we are going to estimate 
     (6) 
To be an inverted U-VKDSHGIXQFWLRQPXVWEH 1DQG 2>014: when the installed base 
is small, the positive effect of the network size expectation on the willingness to pay of 
consumers is stronger than the negative effect of the network size; as soon as the 
                                                     
12
 To prove that we use the estimated coefficients a1 and a2 in equations (a) and (c) of table 1. 
13
 The null hypothesis of the Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors is no 
autocorrelation. First-order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals does not imply that the estimates 
are inconsistent but second-order autocorrelation would imply that the estimates are inconsistent. 
14
 p’= 1+ 2/n=0 Q - 2/ 1.  
p’’= - 2/n2<0 if 2>0; WKHQPXVWEH 1<0. 
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installed base goes beyond the critical mass, the strength of the two effects is reversed 
and the inverse demand function slopes downward. 
The matrix ;     contains some control variables. The critical mass, that is the up-ward 
sloping of the willingness to pay of consumers, depends on the values of the parameters 
1 DQG 2: the strength of network externalities; more concave is the curve, sooner the 
critical mass is reached for any price (see figure 4).  
As said in the introduction, the idea here is to give a methodology to estimate the 
critical mass in a network characterized by network externalities and to find some 
variable which could influence the concavity of the inverse demand curve in the mobile 
telephone market, and then, the critical mass.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    )LJXUH
 
This could have some important implications. In presence of network externalities a 
prospective subscriber will actually decide to join only if some minimum number of the 
other prospects also decide to join. Then individuals base their decision on what they 
expect the others to decide. The individual decision depends on what the perception 
decision of the group is. During the startup of the network, firm faces losses since cost 
exceeds price, while in maturity, when price exceeds cost, the network provider gets 
higher profits. Then, the network provider, to overcome the initial inertia and reach the 
critical mass, will has to do huge amount of investments in terms of subsidies, to 
coordinate the purchasing decisions of consumers. 
In this contest, subsidy needs to create a shared expectation that subscribership will be 
larger than critical mass and, if it occurs, they then will trigger the growth remaining to 
reach the full network maturity. The incremental shift in expectation is realized by the 
creation of a new value considering as necessary what was earlier viewed as novelty. 
cost 
n 
p 
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The amount of those subsidies depends on the extent of network externalities which, as 
said before, influence the critical mass.  
Since the paper focuses on the demand side of the market and, in particular, on the 
identification of the network effects and critical mass, we do not impose any structure 
on the supply side15; from an econometric point of view, the endogeneity problem of 
price can be solved by the instrumental variable techniques. 
Moreover, given that we focus on the identification of network effects, we restrict 
pricing behaviour of the providers by assuming that competition in the mobile telephone 
industry results in setting equal hedonic prices across brands over time for every 
Country. This assumption seems natural, as consumers’ preferences are not brand 
specific. As a consequence, in each instance of time consumers are indifferent toward 
brands. 
In columns (a) and (b) of table 2 are showed the results of the estimation of equation 
(6). Before looking at that, let’s describe the dependent variable “price” in the estimated 
equation. “price” is the mobile cellular price of 3-minute local call (peak and off-peak) 
in US dollars, for Country L at time W. The price of a 3-minute peak and off-peak rate call 
refers to calls from a mobile cellular telephone to a mobile cellular subscriber of the 
same network16. One could think that the initial “connection charge” for a mobile 
network was the most appropriate price in estimating the willingness to pay of 
consumers for mobile telephone services; but we decided to choose the price of calls 
because it grasps a wider kind of network externalities which we call “externality of 
use”, that includes the “network externalities” to which we have referred to until now 
(as a benefit, for existing users, of a new user in the network). 
If a mobile cellular telephone market exhibit a positive critical mass point, we expect to 
observe a negative sign of 1 and a positive sign of 2; these two coefficients measure 
the strength of network effects on the willingness to pay: the stronger the network 
externalities, the sooner the critical mass is reached. More in detail, the higher (the less 
negative) 1 and 2 are, the more concave the demand curve. 
Equation (a) present a fixed effect robust estimation; we control, as before, for the per 
capita GDP in US dollar (*'3    ) and for population (3RS    ), both for Country i at time 
                                                     
15
 The realistic assumption here is of an oligopolistic competition in mobile telecommunication market. 
16
 Given the compatibility of network in the same Country and among Countries, we can consider the 
price of 3-minute call from a mobile cellular telephone to a mobile cellular subscriber of the same 
network as a good proxy of the price of call from a mobile cellular telephone to a mobile cellular 
subscriber of a different network (even to a fixed telephone network). 
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t. We introduce the variable OQTXDQWLW\     which is the natural logarithm of the number 
of mobile telephone calls. We didn’t find this data on the ITU database, but we derived 
it from the Revenue from mobile communication in US dollar17; we treat this variable as 
an endogenous one. The interpretation of its coefficient is an absolute change in price of 
3-minute calls due to a relative change in the quantity of calls; we expect a negative sign 
for this variable. The error term is interpreted as the mean value of the consumer’s 
valuations for unobserved product characteristics, such as product quality for instance. 
The variable EDVH has been described above. 
Let’s comment the results of equation (a). The sign of the EDVH   
 
is negative and
 
that of 
OQEDVH      is positive as expected (both are highly significant): the willingness to pay of 
costumers for mobile calls is up-ward sloping, it reaches a maximum and then it slopes 
downward; then we empirically showed, for this network, that a critical mass point 
exists.  
The coefficient of OQTXDQWLW\    18 is negative and significant meaning that a 1% increase 
in the quantity of calls implies a price of calls reduction of 0.53. Always as expected, 
the signs of *'3     and 3RS     are positive and the coefficients are highly significant. The 
constant term (as &RQVWDQW) is positive and significant: consumers of mobile telephone 
derive network benefits also from fixed line network, thus the constant term captures the 
utility to communicate with a fixed telephony, which we expect to be positive, such as it 
is. 
The estimation in column (a) presents autocorrelation of residuals19. To solve this 
problem we choose a dynamic specification (introducing among regressors one lag of 
the dependent variable 3ULFH) and we estimate by using the Arellano-Bond technique. 
The result are showed in column (b); we can notice that the results do not change; the 
last raw of column (b) present the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation: 
we do not reject the null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation of residuals.  
Using the estimated coefficient in column (b) we draw the price of the 3 minute call 
only taking account of the network externalities effect on the willingness to pay of 
consumers. In order to do that we calculate the price of call in this way 
 
                                                     
17
 Revenue from mobile communication is the revenues from the provision of all types of mobile 
communications services such as mobile cellular, private trunked radio and radio paging. We derive the 
number of telephone call by dividing this revenue for prices of 3-minute call. Then this is just a proxy of 
the quantity of calls. 
18
 In equation (a) the variable OQTXDQWLW\ is taken at time t-1 for endogeneity problems. 
19
 We didn’t show the test. 
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   
 
where EDVH   is the mean of the mobile installed base of subscribers across over the 
Countries for every year (from 1989 to 2006). Figure 5 presents the simulation. 
 
 
    )LJXUH
 
It is evident the up-ward sloping part of the demand curve for mobile services and the 
existence of the critical mass. 
As said above, the idea is to find a set of variables which could affect the extent of 
network externalities and, then, the critical mass, through the concavity of the demand 
curve. In empirical terms, we introduce in the equation (6) some variables in this way 
 
 
          (7) 
 
The interaction terms (such as 9DULDEOH    EDVH     and 9DULDEOH    OQEDVH    ) affect the 
concavity of the demand curve; the term 9DULDEOH     shifts the curve up and down.  
The first variable is the SRSXODWLRQ GHQVLW\ (called 'HQVLW\ in table 2): a higher 
population density means a higher level of human interaction and an easier use of 
telecommunication service. Then, we expect that in Countries with higher population 
density the inverse demand curve for mobile telephone will be more concave. The result 
of the estimation is showed in column (c) of table 2.  
The significance of the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable 
'HQVLW\    OQEDVH     confirms that the strength of network externalities positively 
3ULFH HEDVHOQEDVH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depends on the population density: the higher the population density, the greater the 
concavity of the inverse U.  
The second variable is the internet base of subscribers (called ,QWHUQHW    )20. The sign 
here is not predictable. Internet may be an important communication rival to cellular 
phones and consumers can substitute internet access for mobile subscription. But, on the 
other hands, a higher level of internet penetration may proxy for a telecommunication 
policy environment which generally encourages the adoption of new technologies, 
including mobile phones. 
The result of the estimation are showed in column (d) of table 2. The interpretation 
depends on the extent of the internet subscribers. Indeed, as long as the coefficient of 
EDVHis greater (in absolute value) of the coefficient of ,QWHUQHWEDVHand the coefficient 
of OQEDVH is greater than the coefficient of ,QWHUQHWOQEDVH, an increase of the  
internet subscriber base leads to a greater network externalities effect on the willingness 
to pay for cellular phone. The sign of the ,QWHUQHW is positive and significant, meaning 
that the demand curve shifts up. 
Another variable which we think that could affect the extent of network externalities on 
the willingness to pay of costumers for mobile services is the number of digital 
mainlines (called 'LJLWDO    ). This variable refers to the per cent of main lines connected 
to digital exchanges. This percentage is obtained by dividing the number of main (fixed) 
lines connected to digital telephone exchanges by the total number of main lines. This 
indicator does not measure the percentage of exchanges which are digital, but the 
percentage of inter-exchange lines which are digital or the percentage of digital network 
termination points21. The result of the estimation is in column (e) of table 2. The sign of 
the interaction variable 'LJLWDO    OQEDVH     is negative and significant, meaning a lower 
concavity of the willingness to pay function. The reasons could be: the more the digital 
mainlines the more each nth consumer is unable to be in contact with the other (n-1) 
existing users; moreover, the ability of users to have audio/chat services, completely 
replaces the capability of mobile services.  
At the end, we thought of the rate of schooling (called 6FKRRO    ). We use the ratio of 
total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially 
                                                     
20
 This variable comes from the ITU database; it is defined as the number of total Internet subscribers 
with fixed access, which includes dial-up, total fixed broadband subscribers, cable modem, DSL Internet 
subscribers, other broadband and leased line Internet subscribers. Only active subscribers that have used 
the system within a reasonable period of time is included. 
21
 ITU database. 
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corresponds to the secondary level of education. More educated consumers tend to use 
the mobile phone for business purposes more than less educated one. 
The result is presented in column (f) of table 2. The coefficients of the interaction 
variables 6FKRRO    EDVH     and 6FKRRO    OQEDVH     are both positive meaning that the 
greater the rate of schooling in a Country, the greater the network externalities effect on 
the price of calls, but these coefficient are not significant, probably because of lots of 
missing values in the series. 
 
 &RQFOXGLQJUHPDUNV
 
In this paper we construct a demand model to estimate the network externality effect on 
the mobile telephone network and to check the existence of the critical mass point. Once 
verified that mobile telephone network exhibits strong positive network externalities, 
we expect the willingness to pay for that good be an inverted U-shaped function of the 
installed base of subscribers; this allow us to identify the critical mass point after which 
the network growth becomes explosive. We used a Arellano-Bond and Blundell-Bond 
dynamic panel data estimators (for the 30 OEDC Countries from 1989 to 2006) to prove 
that the network effects played a significant role in the growth of the mobile 
telecommunication market and that we can think of a set of variables, such as the 
population density, the internet base of subscribers, the number of digital mainlines and 
the rate of schooling, which affect the strength of network externalities and then, the 
level of the critical mass. This intuition has some important implications for mobile 
services producers in terms of initial (start-up) investments and marketing strategies to 
reach the critical mass, after that the growth becomes self-sustaining. This paper wants 
to give a methodology to estimate the critical mass that can be applied to every network 
in which network externalities play a significant role. Moreover, it wants to give the 
intuition that there could be some other variables which may affect the intensity of 
network effects in every network and then, its critical mass; this last point is 
fundamental from the point of view of the network good providers.  
One could ask if, for example, 3G and 4G technologies have reached their critical mass, 
and could apply the presented methodology to check the importance of other variables 
in affecting the critical mass for those technologies. 
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Table 1 
EDVH (a) (b) (c) (e) 
basei,t-1 
0.98* 
(25.01) 
0.92* 
(33.4) 
1.16* 
(31.1) 
1.01* 
(26.8) 
(basei,t-1)2 -3.61e-10 (-1.61)  
-7.64e-10* 
(-3.4)  
Log(basei,t-1)  309870.2
**
 
(2.14)  
1016051* 
(3.48) 
GDPi,t 
6.48* 
(2.8) 
7.69* 
(3.5) 
4.05 
(1.00) 
1.15 
(0.4) 
Popi,t 
0.71* 
(3.9) 
0.73* 
(5.12) 
0.03* 
(2.10) 
0.02*** 
(1.8) 
N.obs 480 480 510 510 
Prob > z (2 order) 0.0574 0.0549 0.0422 0.0471 
In parentheses are standardized normal ]-test values. * significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; 
*** significant at 10% level. Equation (a) and (b): Arellano-Bond one-step robust estimation; equations 
(c) and (d): Blundell-Bond one-step robust estimation We include two lags of the dependent variable as 
instruments. Prob > z (2 order) is the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-
differenced errors. 
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
 Table 2 
	
 

  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 

 


7.9* 
(5.9) 
8.52* 
(3.6) 
4.48** 
(2.43) 
9.4* 
(2.43) 
6.62* 
(2.8) 
7.77** 
(2.2) 

 

     
 
0.148* 
(2.78) 
0.14* 
(2.5) 
0.14* 
(2.8) 
0.15* 
(3.09) 
0.08 
(1.22) 



 
  
-9.07e-09** 
(-2.22) 
-8.14e-09** 
(-1.9) 
-1.39e-08* 
(-2.9) 
-1.04e-08*** 
(-1.8) 
-1.04e-08** 
(-2.5) 
-6.31e-08 
(-0.8) 
ﬀ
ﬂﬁ



  ﬃ
  
0.155* 
(3.22) 
0.33* 
(2.3)  
0.30* 
(3.5) 
0.65* 
(4.36) 
0.57* 
(3.7) 
ﬀ
ﬂﬁ ! 


   "
ﬃ
  
-0.533* 
(-7.4) 
-0.72* 
(-5.7) 
-0.398* 
(-5.4) 
-0.72* 
(-5.4) 
-0.74* 
(-5.6) 
-0.92* 
(-6.5) 
#$

  
0.0000307* 
(23.91) 
0.0000259* 
(7.72) 
0.0000258* 
(7.1) 
0.0000253* 
(8.4) 
0.0000268* 
(8.6) 
0.000031* 
(2.8) 

&%
  
4.33e-08** 
(2.16) 
6.02e-08* 
(1.6) 
9.59e-08** 
(2.4) 
4.43e-08 
(0.9) 
6.86e-08*** 
(1.8) 
9.29e-08 
(1.35) 
$
 

  "
   '
ﬀ
ﬂﬁ



  ﬃ
  
  
0.000517* 
(2.46)    
(


 


 

  
   
3.85e-07*** 
(1.78)   
(


 


 

  
'



   
   
1.67e-16*** 
(1.8)   
(


 


 

   '
ﬀ
ﬂﬁ



  ﬃ
  
   
-2.15e-08*** 
(-1.78)   
$
 )ﬂ  
ﬀ
   '
ﬀ
ﬂﬁ



  ﬃ
  
    
-0.000922** 
(-2.3)  
*

,+

ﬀ
  
'



 ,  
     
5.56e-10 
(0.7) 
*

-+

ﬀ
  
'
ﬀ
ﬂﬁ



  ﬃ.  
     
0.0000161 
(0.03) 
1REV 510 480 480 479 438 157 
%
 /,
ﬀ
 
 
ﬁ
0

21
 

ﬃ
 0.53 0.41 0.63 0.99 0.14 
In parentheses are standardized normal ]-test values. * significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** 
significant at 10% level. Equations (a): fixed effects robust estimation, the variable ln(quantity) is taken at time 
t-1 for endogeneity problems; R2=0.7. Equations (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g): Arellano-Bond one-step robust 
estimation. ln(quantity)i,t is the endogenous variable in every equation. Prob > z (2 order) is the p-value of the 
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors. 
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